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This book deals with the simple but rather stark reality -that peace operations do not generate only positive and beneficial outcomes. Peace operations can also have negative consequences -an increase in corruption and criminal activities such as trafficking for example. Peace operations tend to distort the host economy, may cause an increase in sexual violence against women and children and may add to the spread of HIV/ AIDS.
No intervention in a complex system such as a human society can have only one effect. Whenever there is an attempt to bring about change in a complex system, the system reacts in a variety of ways. Some of these reactions are intended, in the sense that the intervention was designed to bring about these changes. Others are unintended, in that those planning the intervention did not mean for these reactions to come about at all.
The traditional focus on peace operations has been on their intended consequences. Researchers and practitioners are typically concerned with improving the ability of peace operations to achieve their intended objectives. We have studied peace operations to find out whether they have been successful, and in measuring their success our focus has usually been on whether they have achieved the mandate they were tasked with. However, various incidents over the last decade have drawn our attention to the fact that peace operations can also generate unintended consequences. In the months leading up to the UN World Summit in 2005, the two examples that were the most frequently used to criticize and ridicule the United Nations, and its Secretary-General, were the Iraq ''oil-for-food scandal'' and the sexual abuses perpetrated by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Both of these examples were especially shocking precisely because of their unintended and counterintuitive nature.
This book is an attempt to shed light on these unintended consequences, not to further de-legitimize peace operations but to encourage lessons learned aimed at improving our ability to undertake peace operations in a more effective and less damaging way in future. In order to do so, we have to understand how unintended consequences come about and explore ways in which we can improve our ability to anticipate and counter potential negative unintended consequences.
Unpacking the terminology
In an edited volume of this nature, it is necessary to start by clarifying what we mean by the terms ''unintended consequences'' and ''peace operations''. The varied contributors to this volume have been selected to bring a range of different insights into peace operations and their unintended consequences. Some associate peace operations with United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Timor Leste. Others think of NATO-style peace support operations in Kosovo or stability operations undertaken by coalitions of the willing such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. And there are examples of unintended consequences from all these missions in this volume. However, in the end the contributors agreed to use the UN collective term for its range of interventions, namely ''peace operations''.
Peace operations
''Peace operations'', the term used in this book, refers to a whole range of multidimensional, multifunctional and complex peace operations, authorized by the UN Security Council, that involve not only military but also various civilian and police components. Although the primary focus is naturally on the United Nations, various chapters in this book incorporate the reality that contemporary peace operations are undertaken not only by the United Nations, but by a variety of other actors, including coalitions of the willing such as ISAF, security alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, regional organizations such as the European Union and the African Union and subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States.1 We exclude mili-tary interventions or actions that fall outside the peacekeeping to peace enforcement spectrum, such as counter-insurgency operations, antiterrorism operations, war and occupation.
The mandates of peace operations vary considerably, but in general they are international interventions undertaken in support of a peace process. In the short term they are designed to monitor cease-fire agreements, provide an enabling secure environment for humanitarian action and prevent a relapse into conflict. In the medium to long term, their purpose is to address the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. However, peace operations cannot achieve such a broad mandate on their own and need to be understood as an integral part of a larger peacebuilding system that consists of security; political, governance and participation; humanitarian; socioeconomic; and justice and reconciliation dimensions. In this context, peace operations are embedded in a larger post-conflict peacebuilding project that simultaneously pursues a broad range of programmes that collectively and cumulatively address both the causes and consequences of a conflict, with the aim of achieving a system-wide impact across the conflict spectrum.
Peacebuilding systems facilitate several simultaneous short-, mediumand longer-term programmes at multiple levels, with a broad range of partners and from a wide range of disciplines, to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid a relapse into violent conflict and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. In this complex multi-agency environment, peacebuilding requires coordination with a wide range of internal and external actors, including government, civil society, the private sector and a multitude of international organizations, agencies and non-governmental organizations, so that the total overall effect of their various initiatives has a coherent impact on the peace process.
Unintended consequences
As peace operation activities have grown in complexity, so have their side-effects. Traditional peacekeeping rested on the assumption that it had no impact on the future direction of the peace process other than to offer a neutral third-party service that would objectively monitor a ceasefire; i.e. the assumption was that the peacekeeping operation was neutral in its effect.2 In the post-Cold War era, however, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was intended to maintain the status quo, to peace operations, which are intended to manage change. 3 As stated earlier, and as will be explored in more detail below, it is not possible to intervene in a complex system such as a human community and have only one effect. Whenever we attempt to change something in a complex system, the system responds to our intervention in a number of ways. We can anticipate that the system will respond in some of these ways, and some of these responses will have been the intended response that we wanted to elicit. However, the system is likely also to respond in other ways that we did not anticipate. All those reactions that fall outside the scope of the response we wanted to elicit are the unintended consequences of our intervention.
The peace operations that are the subjects of our research in this book have mandates that are formulated in the form of a United Nations Security Council resolution. The intended consequences of these operations can be assessed by analysing these mandates. The unintended consequences generated by these operations refer to acts that were not intended when these mandates were adopted or when they were executed.
Some unintended consequences could be foreseen or anticipated, especially if they have occurred in similar circumstances in the past, whereas others may be totally unexpected. These nuances may have important implications and will be discussed in more detail below. It is also important to note that not all side-effects are necessarily negative; some may be neutral and others may actually be positive. This volume will describe and give examples of all three types of unintended consequences, although our primary focus will be on negative unintended consequences because they are potentially the most harmful to the society peacekeepers are intended to serve, as well as to peace operations themselves.
A few qualifications need to be made. Unintended consequences need to be distinguished from a failure to achieve the intended consequences. For example, we exclude from our understanding of unintended consequences failures in achieving economic growth, where economic recovery was mandated, in addressing public crimes, where the maintenance of public security was intended, or in keeping the peace, where peacekeepers were mandated to contain conflicts.
Secondly, unintended consequences need to be distinguished from the ''mixed motive'' phenomenon in intervention decisions. We accept that states participating in peace operations may have motives for supporting operations other than those stated in the formal mandate of the operation. These motives typically include national interests, such as fear that the territory of the state in conflict may be used by international terrorists, or that armed groups opposing the government of a neighbouring country may use the chaos of the conflict to launch attacks against it. Or they may relate to a country's policy to limit the flow of refugees into its territory. Our definition of unintended consequences does not consider these mixed motives themselves as unintended consequences of peace operations, although they may cause or aggravate unintended consequences and will then be addressed in that context.
Thirdly, the fact that this book is devoted to unintended consequences is not meant to suggest that peace operations are doomed to failure or that unintended consequences will always impede the ability of a mission to achieve its intended outcome. It is difficult to make a general assessment of the overall scale and impact of unintended consequences on peace operations. From the cases studied in this book there are few, if any, missions that have failed as a direct result of the unintended consequences they have generated.4 There are many, however, whose effectiveness has been hindered by some of the unintended consequences that have come about as a result of its actions.
This book will conclude that, in general, the success of peace operations has been qualified by negative consequences. But to assess the scope and scale of the degree to which this has been the case one would need to focus on each particular mission. This volume contains a number of country-specific studies5 that provide us with a wide array of missionspecific examples. We will see that in some countries the unintended consequences may be of such a scale that they have a minimal impact on the ability of the peace operation to fulfil its mandate. In others, potentially damaging unintended consequences may be identified at an early stage and managed. In some cases, however, for instance the sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in the DRC, the unintended consequences may have a severe impact far beyond the mission itself. The various examples of unintended consequences studied in this book suggest that some unintended consequences are overestimated,6 whereas other consequences may be only remotely connected to the peace operation itself,7 for there are many variables that influence the outcomes of these complex processes. The book makes the point that unintended consequences come about as part of the dynamic character of complex systems and cannot be avoided. However, we can improve our ability to anticipate, mitigate and discount potential negative unintended consequences and, if we do so, this should result in the improvement of the overall effectiveness of peace operations.
Objective
This brings us to the purpose of this book, which in the first place is to contribute to the improvement of peace operations. The book considers peace operations to be an important instrument in the range of options available to the international community when it attempts to prevent conflict, contain its consequences or manage peace processes. It is there-fore in our collective interest to learn lessons from both our successes and our failures, so as to continuously refine and enhance our capacity to undertake more effective peace operations.
This book is an attempt to focus on one aspect of peace operations that needs to be better understood, namely their unintended consequences. We now know from recent literature, public criticism and international debate that some of these unintended consequences can be extremely damaging to individuals and communities where peacekeepers are deployed. Unintended consequences can weaken the ability of the peace operation to achieve its intended objectives. Some can be harmful to the very concept of peaceful interventions, and may even undermine the legitimacy of the organizations that are responsible for the deployment and supervision of peacekeepers. In order to avoid these potentially negative unintended consequences, we need to understand how they come about and explore ways in which we can improve our ability to anticipate and counter such potential negative unintended consequences. The objective of this book is to make a modest contribution towards enhancing our understanding of the unintended consequences of peace operations.
The editors and contributing authors were struck by the absence of literature on, or even remotely related to, the phenomenon of unintended consequences. Most of the references that were available are anecdotal. The failure to take unintended consequences into account probably stems from the fact that researchers and practitioners have been preoccupied with the intended consequences of peace operations -whether a certain mission has achieved its original intended mandate. The only notable exception to this trend has been the focus given within the realist school of international relations to unintended strategic consequences of limited military intervention, including peace operations. 8 This lack of attention to and awareness of the unintended consequences of peace operations is probably also due to the deeply embedded and uncritical liberal assumptions about peace operations. Not only are peace operations expected to serve largely liberalinternationalist purposes of creating stable, market-oriented democratic polities,9 which are regarded as inherently ''good'', but they are at the same time expected to be successful. Decision-makers, practitioners in the field and analysts operate according to the belief that peace operations authorized by the UN Security Council reflect the will of the international community and therefore are inherently ''good''. Peace operations are therefore expected to produce positive outcomes such as promoting stability and durable peace; they are expected to rebuild and develop; and they are expected to generate respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy. Participation in peace operations by troopcontributing countries is thus a contribution to the global good and the risks involved, including casualties, are regarded as a noble sacrifice for the greater good.10 After the failures of the missions in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, the liberal assumption has been tempered to accept that peace operations may, for a variety of reasons, fail to produce these intended results. However, the liberal assumption has not yet matured to the extent where it is commonly recognized that peace operations also generate unintended consequences -especially negative economic, social or political side-effects that are contrary to the liberal intent.
The fact that peace operations will generate a variety of unintended consequences, some of which may be negative and even pathological to the mandate or the intended consequences of the mission, is thus counterintuitive to many observers under the influence of the liberal assumption that peace operations are inherently ''good''. This book hopes to contribute to breaking down that outdated myth, and to stimulate an awareness that ''unintended consequences'' are a natural characteristic of complex systems, so that it becomes common practice for decisionmakers, practitioners and researchers to anticipate, mitigate and discount, as far as it is possible, potential unintended consequences in their planning, execution and evaluation of peace operations.
Methodology
This edited volume is a collection of studies into various aspects and examples of unintended consequences. Its aim is to improve our understanding of the phenomenon by comparing some of the forms unintended consequences may take, by analysing their causes and impact and by assessing some of the ways in which the international community has tried to manage unintended consequences in the past. The specific examples are complemented by a couple of chapters that analyse the broader phenomenon and, through the introductory and concluding chapters, we hope to shed some light on the different ways in which unintended consequences have been manifested in the past, as well as suggest ways in which unintended consequences can be categorized and offer some recommendations as to how they can be anticipated and countered in future.
Over the last decade, various unintended consequences were identified or hinted at in various types of literature, by international organizations like the United Nations and in public debate. From these, we have selected a couple of examples as being representative of unintended consequences in general, and that could be meaningfully explored in more depth in order to gain deeper insight into the phenomenon. In Part II, the book deals with unintended consequences that have an impact on individuals and groups. In Chapter 2, Henri Myrttinen and Shukuko Koyama look at the unintended consequences of peace operations on Timor Leste from a gender perspective, and, in Chapter 3, Vanessa Kent deals with the sexual exploitation and abuse of civilians by UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, with specific reference to Liberia.
In Part III, Katarina Ammitzboell looks into the impact of peace operations on the host economy, with reference to Afghanistan and Kosovo (Chapter 4). Shin-wha Lee focuses on the unintended consequences of peace operations on humanitarian action in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, Stuart Gordon looks at the unintended consequences of civil-military coordination on peace operations.
In Part IV, the book focuses on the unintended consequences of peace operations for troop-contributing countries. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 look at the phenomenon from the perspective of three prominent troopcontributing countries and regions. Kwesi Aning deals with the case of Ghana in West Africa, C. S. R. Murthy looks into the case of India and South Asia and Arturo C. Sotomayor studies Argentina and Uruguay in the southern cone of South America.
In Part V, the book looks at how the international community can, and has, dealt with unintended consequences. In Chapter 10, Françoise J. Hampson and Ai Kihara-Hunt consider the ways in which the international community deals with violations by international personnel. Florian F. Hoffmann studies the case of the Ombudsman in Kosovo, as one example of how to manage potential unintended consequences, in Chapter 11. And, in Chapter 12, Fré dé ric Mé gret deals with the vicarious responsibility of the United Nations when faced with unintended consequences.
We would have liked to have included some additional chapters. We wanted one on HIV/AIDS but could not find an author willing or able to address this topic, owing to a lack of comparative data. We would have liked to add a chapter on corruption, but again were unable to find an author able to address this topic. Although various chapters in this volume deal with the way in which the United Nations and others have responded to specific unintended consequences, the editors would have liked to add a chapter on the contemporary policies and procedures that the United Nations, at the headquarters level, has in place to deal with some of these unintended consequences. The United Nations was itself, however, dealing with the fallout of the ''sex for aid'' scandal in West Africa and the sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in the DRC and other peace operations at the time this book was researched, and was therefore preoccupied with reassessing its own policies and procedures. In this context, the United Nations declined to contribute such a chapter and, because most of this information was not in the public domain, we were unable to find an author who had sufficient knowledge of the internal procedures and policies of the United Nations system to do justice to this topic.
Theoretical explanations for unintended consequences
It may be of use to consider whether and how unintended consequences have been dealt with by others in the past. This section touches on a couple of theoretical approaches to unintended consequences or related topics with a view to shedding light on the different theoretical explanations that have been put forward in the past to explain unintended consequences and how to manage them.
Complex systems theory
In his book System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Robert Jervis11 argues that, although it is widely known that social life and politics constitute systems, we do not seem to recognize that many outcomes are the unintended consequences of complex interactions. According to Jervis, we are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviours that are different from those of the parts. 12 Jervis argues that, as a result, systems often display nonlinear relationships, which means that outcomes cannot be understood by adding together the units or their relations, and many of the results of actions are unintended. Many others, such as Cilliers,13 regard nonlinearity as a key defining element of complex systems. According to these theorists, unintended consequences should thus be understood within the context of a dynamic, non-linear, complex system that is constantly self-regulating through multiple feedback mechanisms. You do not need a complex system to have unintended consequences but, when you are dealing with complex systems, unintended consequences should be understood as a natural outcome of the dynamics of such a system and the phenomenon should therefore not come as a surprise.
Jervis goes on to point out that, in a system, the chains of consequences extend over time and over many areas and they are always multiple. He uses the example of doctors, who refer to the undesired impacts of medication as ''side-effects''. Although there is no criterion other than our intent to determine which effects are the intended effects and which effects are ''side'' effects, the point is that disturbing a system will produce sev-eral changes.14 Hardin agrees with Jervis when he argues that, as result of the interconnectedness of systems, one can never merely do one thing. He argues that in a complex system it is not possible to develop ''a highly specific agent which will do only one thing''. 15 Charles Perrow studied ''error-inducing'' systems whose problems cannot be traced to faults in any particular element or to the relationship between any of them. He found that when interconnections are dense it may be difficult to trace the impact of any change even after the fact, let alone predict it ahead of time, making the system complex and hard to control. 16 Interconnections are highlighted when a system is disturbed by the introduction of a new element,17 for instance the impact of the presence of a peace operation on the host economy. Because most systems either have been designed to cope with adversity or have evolved in the face of it, breakage or overload at one point rarely destroys them. It will, however, produce disturbances at other points.18 Extensive interconnections in a system make it flexible, but they also mean that disruptions can spread easily throughout a system. 19 Jervis argues that, in a system, actions have unintended effects on the actor, on others and on the system as a whole, which means that one cannot infer results from intent and expectations and vice versa.20 He concludes that the phenomenon -namely that consequences are unintended -is a basic product of complex interconnections. In some cases the results can be the reverse of the intention, in others they can be orthogonal to it, as with the side-effects of medications.21
Problems are created when the effects of incentives cannot be limited to the target population,22 for instance when the level of assistance to a refugee camp or a camp for internally displaced people creates tension with the surrounding host community because the availability of food inside the camp is better than outside, or when ex-combatants are perceived to benefit more from the international community, through a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, than those who did not participate in the violence. Assisting some categories of beneficiaries may make it worthwhile for others to assume that status, for instance in times of famine when parents may abandon some of their children because a specific aid agency caters only for abandoned children. Supply creates its own demand in what economists call the ''moral hazard'' problem: people who know that they will be helped if they are in need may not struggle hard to avoid this outcome.23
This does not mean that we are powerless in the face of unpredictable and unstable system effects. Jervis argues that system effects change as actors learn about them and about others' beliefs about them.24 Jervis suggests three general methods of acting when system effects may be prevalent and powerful. First, people can constrain other actors and reduce if not eliminate the extent to which their environment is highly systemic and characterized by unintended consequences. Second, the appreciation that people operate in a system may enable them to compensate for the results that would otherwise occur. Third, people may be able to proceed toward their goals indirectly and can apply multiple policies, either simultaneously or sequentially, in order to correct or take advantage of the fact that, in a system, consequences are multiple. None of this guarantees success, but human action can be effective in the face of complex interconnections, and a systems approach need not induce paralysis. 25 While complex interactions in a system mean that some of the consequences will be unintended and undesired, it is hard to measure their frequency. Albert Hirschman points out that straightforward effects are common and often dominate perverse ones.26 If this were not the case, it would be hard to see how societies make progress or how any stable human interaction could develop. 27 The double effect theory
The traditional philosophical debate about the ethical problems caused by unintended consequences has become known as the ''double effect'' debate. Gregory Reichberg and Henrik Syse28 argue that we enter the terrain of ''side-effect harm'' when moral, legitimate acts have undesired effects. ''Double effect'' refers to the two different kinds of effect that our interventions tend to have. On the one hand, there is the intended outcome that our actions were meant to produce. On the other hand, there are the side-effects, or unintended consequences, that result from our intervention. The idea that we are answerable for these unintended consequences, yet in a manner that is different from the accountability that is associated with our intentional projects, has been dubbed the ''principle of double effect''.
The phenomenon of double effect becomes a moral problem when the side-effects are not desirable, and especially when they are harmful for those affected. Actors are responsible for such side-effects when these are foreseeable and they still choose to proceed. Actors are blameworthy for harmful side-effects when they allow them to happen if they could have been prevented, or when they make no, or only an insignificant, attempt to minimize them. 29 The principle of double effect can serve as a valuable tool when applying ethical considerations to the unintended consequences of peace operations.
The principle of double effect is a moral principle for assessing actions that produce side-effect harm. In short, it states that, although actors are responsible for the harmful side-effects that ensue from their actions, actions that produce harmful side-effects are nevertheless permissible provided that: (1) the primary goal of the action is legitimate; (2) the side-effects are not part of the actor's intended goal; (3) the side-effects are not a means to this goal; (4) the actor aims to prevent or minimize the side-effects; and (5) no alternative courses of action could have been taken that would have led to fewer or no side-effects.30 The principle of double effect can be used both as a tool for analysing actions that have already taken place, and as a guide for action in obligating actors to consider in advance what side-effects might result from their actions and, if presumed harmful, how these effects can be prevented or minimized.
Just War theory
Just War theory holds that, in certain circumstances, war can be justified and is thus not always immoral. Just War theory builds on double effect theory, but is focused on decisions about going to war or undertaking military interventions. In the process, Just War theorists have articulated a set of conditions for war and interventions that can be useful when considering the ethical aspects of the unintended consequences of peace operations. In this context we will consider two elements of Just War theory, namely competent authority and intention, and we will address the issue of inclusive moral deliberation.
Competent authority
One aspect of Just War theory argues that only specially designated public officials, paying due attention to legal constraints, have the authority to engage a nation in a course of armed conflict.31 Put differently, the task of the competent authority is to oversee the social impacts of the intervention, with due attention to national and international law. The competent authority has a responsibility to identify and anticipate unintended consequences. Just War theory argues that, when negative impacts are the result of an exercise of authority, even if purely incidental and unintended, those in positions of authority have a responsibility to take measures to eliminate or mitigate these impacts.32
An additional reason competent authority is important is that it must be possible, both during the decision-making process and after the fact, to see clearly who made what decision. Thus, procedural transparency is crucial, so that those affected by the decision can have some trust that the right people are making the decisions. Or, put alternatively, the actual decision-making process must be able to be revealed at some later stage, so that it is open to criticism and assignment of responsibility.33
Intention
A very important notion in Just War theory is the criterion of intention. The criterion takes note of the fact that an agent may have just cause but nevertheless act from a wrongful intention,34 for example, delivering humanitarian assistance to a particular beneficiary population for the sake of attracting media attention instead of on the basis of need. This criterion focuses attention on the goals or aims of the intervention and the way in which those goals should influence the actions performed and the strategies followed. This is an important part of the ''right intention'' idea: it seeks to direct our attention to the actual good we seek to attain through our actions. 35 We would not describe the purpose of medicine in terms of what is good for the physician,36 yet in peace operations you often hear arguments such as those made stating that the United Nations should educate peacekeepers to follow the code of conduct because their poor behaviour is harmful to the image of the United Nations, rather than focusing on the harm their behaviour may be causing.
Inclusive moral deliberation
Deon Rossouw suggests caution in transferring Just War theory and the principle of double effect from their traditional contexts.37 He identifies three key ''dis-analogies'' between the context of international business (which is his focus) and war, one of which is of particular importance to our context. Rossouw argues that the nature of war is such that decisions about military engagement and the moral implications thereof have to be made unilaterally. He argues that international business differs from war because business has the possibility of engaging with those who might be affected by the foreseeable negative consequences of its actions. This is true in the peace operations context as well, or at least in those missions where consensus is understood to be a prerequisite for the deployment of a peace operation, which is the norm in United Nations peace operations.
Dwight Furrow argues that ethical principles, despite their pretension to be objective, tend to be parochial. We tend to universalize our own ethical standards and to impose our ethical preferences and ethical interpretations upon others.38 Consequently, unilateral ethical deliberations, despite the best intentions, contribute to ethical blind spots. In peace operations, however, the possibility to engage the stakeholders, both internal and external, about the impact of negative consequences on them creates the opportunity for bilateral and multilateral moral deliberation that does not exist in the Just War tradition.
To paraphrase Rossouw, peacekeepers or humanitarian agencies do not have to deliberate on their own about the possible foreseeable unintended consequences of their actions, but can engage directly with those they suspect might be affected negatively to find out how they perceive the intended actions. Through such proactive stakeholder engagement the peacekeepers and aid workers might learn of more side-effects, both positive and negative, that they had not initially foreseen given their lack of knowledge of host country realities. 39 The latter is implicit in various humanitarian and development codes of conduct and initiatives, such as ''The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief'',40 the Rome Declaration on Harmonization41 and the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative,42 and has been addressed by some of the initiatives on peacebuilding,43 but more can be done to integrate this approach into the planning and management of peace operations.
The ''do no harm'' approach Another approach, perhaps more contemporary and thus better known among the peace and aid practitioner community, is Mary Anderson's ''do no harm'' approach to international humanitarian and development assistance. 44 The ''do no harm'' approach has come about as a result of the work of the Local Capacities for Peace Project, which is aimed at improving the ability of humanitarian or development assistance programmes to operate in conflict situations in ways that assist local people without feeding into or exacerbating the conflict.
The ''do no harm'' initiative confirms and recognizes complex system effects and argues from the outset that, when international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes part of that context and thus also of the conflict.45 The research of the Local Capacities for Peace Project has shown that the interaction between external aid and local communities produces relatively predictable outcomes. Anderson argues that, when one can start to anticipate aid's impact, it becomes possible to avoid negative effects and enhance positive ones.
Although acknowledging that international aid has done harm in certain cases, Anderson argues that it is a moral and logical fallacy to conclude that, because aid can do harm, a decision not to give aid would do no harm. In reality, a decision to withhold aid from people in need would have unconscionable negative ramifications. She argues instead that the challenge for aid workers, and their donors, is to figure out how to do the good they mean to do without inadvertently undermining local strengths, promoting dependency and allowing aid resources to be misused in the pursuit of war.46
The ''do no harm'' project is a very practical attempt at improving aid by proposing a framework that aid workers can use when planning, monitoring and evaluating their programmes to ensure that these programmes are implemented in such a way as to avoid negative effects and enhance positive ones. We will return to the potential of the ''do no harm'' project to be applied beyond the humanitarian and development assistance sphere in the concluding chapter.
Conclusion
The purpose of this book is to contribute to the improvement of peace operations. It is an attempt to focus on one aspect of peace operations that needs to be better understood, namely their unintended consequences. Unintended consequences can be negative, neutral or positive, but our focus will mainly be on the negative unintended consequences, because they are the most harmful to the communities that peace operations are intended to serve, to the very notion of peace operations and to the organizations that mandate and deploy peacekeepers. In order to avoid these potentially negative unintended consequences, this book intends shedding light on how they come about and it explores ways in which we can improve our ability to anticipate and counter such potential negative unintended consequences. The objective of this book is thus to make a modest contribution towards enhancing our understanding of the unintended consequences of peace operations.
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